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SUBPRIME LENDING OVER TIME:
THE ROLE OF RACE 
INTRODUCTION
  Ideally, a prospective borrower seeking a mortgage loan would prefer to receive a prime loan. But such 
loans are generally available only to those with a high credit rating (i.e., those deemed highly creditworthy) and 
with sufficient funds to qualify for the loan.  Those who have flawed credit (a history of late payments and/or a 
high debt-to-income ratio), not enough for a down payment, or no reserve funds usually obtain subprime loans. 
The terms of these loans are less favorable than those offered under prime loans.  The difference between the 
two types of loans reflects the lender’s risk assessment in making the loan. However, in the wake of efforts to 
increase access to mortgage capital for all potential borrowers, questions continue to be raised about the influ-
ence of race in determining whether a borrower receives a prime or subprime loan.  
  In light of the increased scrutiny of the subprime market nationally and the concerns raised by com-
munity leaders in the Federal Reserve’s Third District (which includes the eastern portion of Pennsylvania, 
southern New Jersey, and Delaware) that low- and moderate-income and minority homeowners are targeted to 
receive high-cost loans,1 this study will examine the extent to which subprime lending occurs in Pennsylvania, 




  During the 1990s, there was a surge in lending in the mortgage industry. While loans by both subprime 
and prime lenders increased, loans by subprime lenders grew at a significantly faster pace. Between 1994 and 
2003, prime lenders’ originations grew by an annual rate of roughly 18 percent, but subprime lenders’ loans 
increased by approximately 25 percent per year.2 In 1994, the share of loans by subprime lenders was only 4.5 
percent of all mortgage loans. The share of subprime loans rose to 14.5 percent in 1997 and then declined (Fig-
ure 1). In 2003, subprime loan originations comprised about 9 percent of total loan originations. This amounted 
to nearly a ten-fold growth in the total value of subprime loan originations, from $35 billion to $332 billion.3 
The share of subprime loans then reached its highest level in 2005, when it was 21 percent of all loans. By 2007, 
subprime loans had declined to roughly 8 percent of total loan originations.   
1 These concerns were raised at outreach meetings conducted by the staff of the Reserve Bank’s Community Affairs Department.  During 
outreach meetings, the Reserve Bank’s staff members meet with representatives of financial institutions, government agencies, nonprofit 
organizations, and consumer advocates to determine mutual areas of interest and activity as well as to discuss any finance-related issues that 
concern them.  The targeting of certain segments of the population for subprime loans is thought to occur, in part, because unscrupulous 
mortgage brokers work closely with some subprime lenders. While not specifically mentioned during the outreach meetings, some cor-
respondent banks, it is worth noting, have also made questionable high-cost loans. 
2 See the article by Governor Edward M. Gramlich.
3 See Gramlich (2004).6
  The  growth  in  mort-
gage  loans  was  accompanied 
by  the  offering  of  mortgage 
products  with  features  such 
as an adjustable rate, interest-
only payments, loans requiring 
no down payment, and those 
requiring  little  or  no  docu-
mentation  of  income  or  debt 
burden  that  helped  prospec-
tive homebuyers with poor or 
limited credit histories to qual-
ify for a home loan.4 The rise 
in  prime  and  subprime  loans 
helped fuel the increase in the 
national  homeownership  rate 
over the 1994 to 2003 period, 
from 64 percent to 68.3 percent. 5,6  In addition to new homebuyers, homeowners have also used subprime loans 
to refinance their mortgages. Moreover, lenders were emboldened to seek out potential borrowers for subprime 
loans to satisfy investors’ demand for such loans to be securitized. While subprime lending has enabled some 
borrowers to move beyond their credit-blemished past into homes or provide current homeowners with extra 
funds through refinancing, there has been a downside. Unfortunately, subprime loans have been at the center 
of the discussion on foreclosures. High-cost lending has placed some borrowers who may not have been ready 
for homeownership or a refinance loan in an untenable financial position while stripping other homeowners of 
their equity7 — their primary asset for wealth accumulation — when refinancing their loan.  A special point 
of contention in this debate has been over minorities receiving a disproportionate share of subprime loans. Of 
concern is the extent to which the disparity in subprime lending is due to minority status.  
Previous Studies
  In complying with the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA)8 of 1975, most mortgage lending in-
stitutions began collecting loan-level data — which they report to the Federal Financial Institutions Examina-
tion Council — that could be used to enhance the enforcement of laws prohibiting discrimination in lending. 
Since then, these unique data have shown that lending disparities exist along racial and income lines. In 2005, 
for example, an examination of HMDA data by Avery et al. revealed that African-Americans were more likely 
FIGURE 1. Subprime Mortgage Originations 
as a Percent of Total Originations
4 As Chris Henderson so aptly points out, these nontraditional loans  are legal and intended for savvy borrowers.  Potential problems arise 
when these complex products are obtained by unsophisticated borrowers. See Henderson (2007).   
5 See Gramlich (2004).
6 In 2007, the homeownership rate declined slightly to 68.1 percent.  See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homeownership_in_the_Unit-
ed_States. 
7 For a discussion of legislation signed by Wisconsin Governor Jim Doyle to address this issue, see “Doyle to Sign Legislation Against 
Predatory Lenders.”
8 See http://www.ffiec.gov/hmda/default.htm. 7
to receive higher-priced loans than borrowers of other race categories.  According to the data, the (unmodi-
fied or “gross”) incidence of higher-priced lending for conventional home-purchase loans was 54.7 percent for 
African-Americans, 46.1 percent for Hispanic whites, 17.2 percent for non-Hispanic whites, and 16.6 percent 
for Asians.9 
  HMDA data have been used in a number of studies to investigate many aspects of lending, including 
the subprime/prime dynamic. But given that the data do not include all the credit and risk variables considered 
by lenders when making credit decisions, many studies have attempted to augment the HMDA data set with 
credit variables in order to better explain the lending disparity among racial or income groups. Failure to account 
for variances in creditworthiness or doing so at an aggregated level runs the risk of erroneously attributing any 
differential treatment in lending to race. 
  An earlier study by Immergluck and Wiles explored the relationship between neighborhood variables 
and the proportion of refinance loans originated by subprime lenders.10 They used 1998 HMDA data, the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) list of subprime lenders, and selected census data, 
but they did not include credit risk variables. The authors found that neighborhoods that were predominantly 
African-American experienced higher rates of subprime lending.  Among the other variables that were found 
to influence subprime lending were educational attainment, median home value, and neighborhoods that were 
mixed-minority. 11,12  
  Bocian, Ernst, and Li (2006) also used an augmented HMDA data set (including credit scores) to model 
a logistical regression on the likelihood of receiving a higher-rate loan in 2004. They concluded that race and 
ethnicity continue to be a factor in subprime loan pricing, with African-Americans and Hispanics more likely 
to receive higher-priced home-purchase and refinance subprime loans than similarly situated white borrow-
ers — particularly for loans with prepayment penalties.13 However, this study is limited in that it surveyed only 
subprime loans.
  An analysis by Calem, Gillen, and Wachter used 1999 HMDA data, the HUD subprime list, 2000 
census data, credit information on the tract level, and foreclosure data to estimate the frequency of subprime 
loans by neighborhood given the demographic composition of the neighborhood.14 They conducted their inves-
tigation on the tract level by focusing on the percentage of tract loans that were subprime and the loan level 
by considering whether the loan received was subprime.  They found that credit risk (i.e., the proportion of 
individuals with low credit scores or without credit records) was associated with the share of subprime loans in 
a census tract, but that African-Americans were still positively correlated with a neighborhood’s subprime share 
in both Chicago and Philadelphia. Moreover, African-Americans were highly likely to obtain a subprime loan, 
regardless of where they lived.15
9 See Avery, Brevoort, and Canner (2006), p. A160.
10 See Immergluck and Wiles (1999), p. 25.
11 See Immergluck and Wiles (1999), p. 26.
12 For a related line of inquiry that focuses on the role that neighborhood characteristics play in the loan-decision process via information 
externalities, see Lang and Nakamura (1993) and Blackburn and Vermilyea (2007).    
13 See Bocian, Ernst, and Li (2006), p. 3.
14 See Calem, Gillen, and Wachter (2004), p. 396.
15 See Calem, Gillen, and Wachter (2004), p. 401.8
  Although the findings by Calem, Gillen, and Wachter are quite enlightening, their controls for credit 
risk were based on tract level and not individual borrowers. However, the present study uses a unique data set 
(a merging of HMDA data and  data from a national proprietary data set on loan performance with millions 
of loan-level records of originations) to examine subprime lending over time in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and 
Delaware and the influence of race in the mortgage-lending process. This data set not only allows us to study 
subprime lending over time but also contains loan-level information on variables that allow for better controls 
over factors correlated with race so that better inferences can be drawn.
  Moreover, while earlier studies have shown a racial disparity in lending with respect to prime and sub-
prime loans, the present study improves upon previous efforts by using an estimating procedure that allows the 
differences in the probability of receiving a subprime loan over a prime loan to be separated into that portion 
arising from differences in identifiable characteristics and the remaining portion, which may be attributable in 
part to bias in mortgage lending.  In the former portion, not only are the explanatory characteristics identified 
but their separate contributions are quantified.  Thus, this study will fine-tune the influence of race in the al-
location of mortgage capital between the prime and subprime markets.
METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
  The examination of subprime lending over time in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware and the 
role played by race is carried out in three stages. First, we consider an overview of mortgage lending in the three 
states for 1999 through 2007. We pay attention to the breakdown of prime and subprime loans by race and 
income for conventional home purchase, refinance, and home improvement. Of special interest are the overall 
subprime rates for each year by race (African-American and white) and the subsequent gap between African-
Americans and whites.  We also take note of the change in the gap from 1999 to 2007.  
  To establish the existence of a racial disparity in subprime lending and further investigate the underlying 
influences of the racial disparity in the subprime lending gap, two types of regression analysis are employed.                  
Data
  The analysis in the study is based on a data set constructed by merging data from several sources. The 
data set is composed of information extracted from the merging of HMDA data and data from a national pro-
prietary data set on loan performance for 1999 through 2007.  The data from the national proprietary data set 
contain loan-level information from most of the top 10 residential mortgage servicers in the industry.16  Our 
data set also contains selected variables obtained from U.S. census data.  Added to these data is a list of lenders 
compiled by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to indicate whether loans were 
prime or subprime in 1999 through 2003. HUD employed a methodology that characterized a lender as prime 
or subprime by determining, through research in trade publications, websites, or telephone interviews, the type 
of loans originated by a lender. Many lenders readily identified themselves as subprime lenders, while others 
indicated the proportion of subprime loans they originated. If a lender predominantly originated prime loans 
(i.e., more than 50 percent), the lender was considered a prime lender. If, however, the lender predominantly 
originated subprime loans, the lender was classified as a subprime lender. For the purposes of our database, all 
loans originated by a HUD-designated subprime lender were considered subprime, while all loans originated by 
a lender not designated by HUD as subprime were considered prime.
16 The data are 58 percent of the total market and a third of the subprime market. 9
  The HUD list was discontinued in 2005. However, in 2004, HMDA began requiring lenders to disclose 
the pricing (interest rates and fees) for loans. This information is used to classify loans as “higher-priced” if the 
mortgage has an annual percentage rate (APR) 3 percentage points over the designated benchmark (Treasury 
securities).17 The higher-priced loans are a proxy for subprime. In our analysis, we use the HMDA higher-priced 
designation for subprime loans in 2004 through 2007.18    
  The particular variables used in the analysis include socio-economic variables such as race (African-
American, white), gender, and borrower’s income.19 We used several variables to capture neighborhood influ-
ences. These measures include the percent of owner-occupied units, tract income (low, moderate, middle, and 
upper), and whether the tract is a minority tract (over 50 percent minority). We also included information on 
the borrower’s loan amount and type of loan (conventional home purchase, refinance, or home improvement).   
In addition, to depict credit and other risk factors, we used some variables that underwriters typically rely on.   
These variables consist of loan amount, debt-to-income ratio (DTI), credit score,20 and documentation type 
(full documentation and not full documentation).21 Following Calem, Gillen, and Wachter, we include the 
turnover rate of tract housing stock.22 According to Calem et al., “Neighborhoods with little turnover will tend 
to have more uncertain housing values and, hence, represent greater credit risk.”23 We also used HMDA data 
to compute a denial rate for non-subprime conventional loans. Calem et al. suggest that this measure can be 
viewed as a proxy for the availability of such loans as well as a possible proxy for omitted risk variables. 24                 
RESULTS 
Analysis Results
  First, we focus on the subprime lending patterns by race in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware 
from 1999 to 2007. Next, we consider the disparities in subprime loans by race and then by income. Then we 
present the results of the logistic regression analysis of the racial disparities in subprime lending. Finally, we esti-
mate the percent of the racial gap explained by differences in the observable characteristics between the races.
  Spatial Location of Subprime Loans.  The subprime loans of African-Americans and whites were geo-
coded to the census tract level in each of the three states for 1999 to 2007. Of interest is not only the spatial 
location of the loans but also the change in lending patterns over time. In order to highlight these two aspects, 
only the maps for 1999 and 2005 for each race in the three states will be shown. (The remaining maps are avail-
able from the authors upon request.)  
17 See Avery, Canner, and Cook (2005), pp. 344–94.
18 Even though the HUD list and the HMDA higher-priced designations for subprime lenders affect the estimates of loan originations, 
their use in the regressions estimated in this study where they overlap did not appreciably affect the results.  For a similar result, see Mayer 
and Pence (2009).
19 A list of the variables can be found in appendix Table A-1, p. 25. 
20 This is a FICO score.
21 We were unable to use the loan-to-value ratio variable, since it does not include second liens on the property. 
22 This variable is equal to the number of home-purchase loans from HMDA divided by the number of owner-occupied housing units from 
the census.
23 See Calem et al. (2004), p. 398.
24 See Calem et al. (2004), p. 398.10
  In Pennsylvania, the main clusters of subprime loans for whites in 1999 are located in Philadelphia, 
Allentown/Easton/Bethlehem, Scranton/Wilkes-Barre, Reading, Harrisburg, York, Pittsburgh, and Erie (Figure 
2). In 2005, subprime loans increased in some of these locations and spread to nearby areas (Figure 3). Figure 4 
reveals a similar location of subprime-loan clusters for African-Americans in 1999. While subprime loans also 
increased for African-Americans in 2005, the increases are most notable in Mount Pocono, East Stroudsburg, 
Allentown/Easton/Bethlehem, and York (Figure 5).
Data Source: HMDA and a Large Mortgage Servicer Database.  Prepared by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Community 
Affairs Department.
PENNSYLVANIA Subprime Lending Patterns by Census Tract
FIGURE 2: Ratio of Subprime Loans to Whites, 1999












































































































































  The spatial location of subprime loans for whites in New Jersey in 1999 tended to cluster in the north-
eastern part of the state in Paterson, Jersey City, Newark, and Elizabeth. Other clusters occurred in the areas of 
Asbury Park, Trenton, and Camden (Figure 6). Figure 7 shows that subprime loans for whites increased some-
what in the same general areas in 2005. The clusters of subprime loans for African-Americans in 1999 were 
located in the same areas as those for whites (Figure 8). However, Figure 9 reveals that in 2005, subprime loans 
for African-Americans increased in the same areas in which clusters occurred in 1999, but there were additional 
PENNSYLVANIA Subprime Lending Patterns by Census Tract
Data Source: HMDA and a Large Mortgage Servicer Database.  Prepared by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Community 
Affairs Department.
FIGURE 4: Ratio of Subprime Loans to African-Americans, 1999










































































































































NEW JERSEY Subprime Lending Patterns by Census Tract
Data Source: HMDA and a Large Mortgage Servicer Database.  Prepared by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Community 
Affairs Department.
FIGURE 6: 
Ratio of Subprime Loans to Whites, 1999
FIGURE 7: 
Ratio of Subprime Loans to Whites, 2005
FIGURE 8: 
Ratio of Subprime Loans to African-Americans, 1999
FIGURE 9: 




































































































clusters in such locations as Willingboro, Millville, and Atlantic City.  
  The location of subprime loans for whites in Delaware in 1999 occurred in the northern part of the state 
(Wilmington area), the center of the state (Dover area), and the southernmost part of the state (Figure 10). While 
subprime loans increased in all three states in 2005, the change in the location pattern was most dramatic in Dela-
ware. As Figure 11 shows, subprime loans for whites occurred throughout the state. Figures 12 and 13 illustrate 
that the pattern of subprime loans for African-Americans in Delaware in 1999 and 2005 mirrors that of whites.                         
DELAWARE Subprime Lending Patterns by Census Tract
FIGURE 10: 
Ratio of Subprime Loans to Whites, 1999
FIGURE 11: 
Ratio of Subprime Loans to Whites, 2005
Data Source: HMDA and a Large Mortgage Servicer Database.  Prepared by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Community 
Affairs Department.
FIGURE 12: 
Ratio of Subprime Loans to African-Americans, 1999
FIGURE 13: 



































  Racial Disparities.25  Table 1 shows a breakdown in the percent of subprime loans in 1999 through 2007 
by state and race for conventional home-purchase, refinance, and all loans.  Overall, African-Americans have 
TABLE 1. 
Racial Disparities in Subprime Rates in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware  
             
  PENNSYLVANIA
  African-American       
Type of Loan  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007
                 
Conventional Home-Purchase Loans  5.7%  7.3%  8.1%  7.4%  6.4%  19.5%  35.9%  46.1%  34.5%
Refinance Loans  23.6%  47.4%  13.0%  12.5%  9.4%  15.2%  30.2%  48.8%  32.4%
All Loans  8.4%  11.1%  8.6%  9.6%  7.1%  15.1%  30.0%  42.4%  29.7%
Sample Size  1454  1536  1655  2302  3361  4361  4741  4973  4750
                 
  White       
Type of Loan  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007
                 
Conventional Home-Purchase Loans  1.5%  2.3%  2.7%  1.9%  2.6%  5.9%  10.7%  14.5%  10.9%
Refinance Loans  4.9%  12.8%  3.6%  3.6%  3.8%  5.9%  10.6%  21.1%  13.3%
All Loans  2.4%  4.0%  3.1%  2.8%  3.3%  5.6%  10.2%  15.9%  11.2%
Sample Size  27591  24089  49826  68527  96185  83778  79699  63895  65002
                 
  NEW JERSEY         
 
  African-American       
Type of Loan  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007
                 
Conventional Home-Purchase Loans  2.0%  2.6%  3.4%  3.2%  4.1%  13.3%  32.3%  39.4%  22.8%
Refinance Loans  7.1%  16.3%  4.9%  6.4%  7.0%  11.1%  23.9%  37.1%  21.7%
All Loans  2.9%  6.1%  3.7%  4.6%  5.8%  10.8%  25.8%  36.1%  20.9%
Sample Size  1546  1527  2322  3201  5281  6096  6795  6474  5572
                 
  White       
Type of Loan  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007
                 
Conventional Home-Purchase Loans  1.2%  1.7%  1.4%  1.0%  1.1%  3.0%  6.7%  11.5%  6.8%
Refinance Loans  2.6%  6.3%  2.5%  2.0%  2.5%  4.1%  8.0%  17.0%  10.0%
All Loans  1.6%  2.7%  2.2%  1.7%  2.1%  3.5%  7.2%  14.0%  8.3%
Sample Size  24406  19575  43933  62481  89862  71078  62795  45628  45871
                 
  DELAWARE         
       
  African-American       
Type of Loan  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007
                 
Conventional Home-Purchase Loans  3.4%  7.2%  7.9%  4.6%  6.0%  11.0%  29.5%  38.1%  23.9%
Refinance Loans  11.0%  37.3%  6.8%  7.6%  9.8%  10.9%  26.2%  36.7%  22.8%
All Loans  5.1%  8.1%  5.2%  4.8%  8.1%  9.2%  25.1%  33.7%  20.5%
Sample Size  235  265  362  492  428  1035  1239  1265  1027
                 
  White       
Type of Loan  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007
                 
Conventional Home-Purchase Loans  0.8%  1.6%  1.3%  1.1%  1.9%  3.3%  8.2%  10.7%  6.4%
Refinance Loans  2.5%  5.5%  2.0%  2.1%  3.3%  4.0%  9.0%  16.1%  8.5%
All Loans  1.3%  2.1%  1.7%  1.6%  2.8%  3.5%  8.3%  12.4%  7.0%
Sample Size  2776  2617  5758  7699  6430  9623  8826  6289  6134
Note: These are univariate statistics.                 
25 The analysis in this study focuses only on African-Americans and whites.15
a higher percentage of subprime loans than whites in all three states in all years. Moreover, the percentage for 
African-Americans is nearly two times that of whites in all years in all states, and this pattern holds for each type 
of loan.  (However, bear in mind that these are simple univariate statistics and that race might be a proxy for other 
variables correlated with risk and/or demand.)  
  The disparity in the percentage of subprime loans by race gives rise to a racial gap (Table 2). As Table 2 
shows, there is a double-digit subprime gap among African-Americans and whites in the two types of loans and 
in all loans in 2005-2007 in all three states. Of the three states, Pennsylvania had the largest gap for all loans 
during the period, as well as all but one of the two different types of loans. However, the overriding point is that 
there is a racial gap in all years, in all loans, and in all states studied (albeit rather small for conventional home-
purchase loans in 1999 and 2000 in New Jersey).
  Income Differences. The differences in income by the race of borrowers holding subprime loans are also 
of interest. Table 3 presents the racial disparities in subprime mortgage holders by income for Pennsylvania, New 
Jersey, and Delaware for 1999-2007.  African-Americans had a higher percentage of subprime loans than whites 
in each income category (low, moderate, middle, and upper) in all three states in all years, except for low income 
in 1999 in New Jersey and in 2002 in Delaware. Particularly noteworthy is the percentage of subprime mortgage 
Table 2. 
Percentage Point Disparities in Subprime Rates by Race in Pennsylvania, 
New Jersey, and Delaware                  
                 
  PENNSYLvANIA         
         
Type of Loan  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007
                 
Conventional Home-Purchase Loans  4.1%  5.0%  5.3%  5.5%  3.8%  13.6%  25.2%  31.6%  23.6%
Refinance Loans  18.7%  34.6%  9.4%  8.9%  5.7%  9.3%  19.6%  27.7%  19.1%
All Loans  6.0%  7.1%  5.5%  6.8%  3.9%  9.4%  19.8%  26.4%  18.4%
Sample Size  29045  25625  51481  70829  99546  88139  84440  68868  69752
                 
  NEW JERSEY   
                 
Type of Loan  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007
                 
Conventional Home-Purchase Loans  0.8%  0.9%  2.0%  2.2%  3.0%  10.3%  25.7%  27.9%  16.0%
Refinance Loans  4.6%  9.9%  2.4%  4.4%  4.5%  7.0%  16.0%  20.1%  11.7%
All Loans  1.3%  3.4%  1.5%  2.9%  3.7%  7.3%  18.5%  22.1%  12.6%
Sample Size  25952  21102  46255  65682  95143  77174  69590  52102  51443
                 
  DELAWARE       
                 
Type of Loan  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007
                 
Conventional Home-Purchase Loans  2.6%  5.6%  6.6%  3.4%  4.1%  7.7%  21.3%  27.4%  17.5%
Refinance Loans  8.5%  31.8%  4.8%  5.6%  6.5%  6.9%  17.3%  20.6%  14.3%
All Loans  3.8%  6.0%  3.5%  3.2%  5.3%  5.8%  16.8%  21.3%  13.5%
Sample Size                                                  3011  2882  6120  8191  6858  10658  10065  7554  7161
Note: These percentages reflect the African-American subprime rates minus the white subprime rates.         
       
         Sample size indicates combined sample of African-Americans and whites.             
   
         These are univariate statistics.                 16
TABLE 3. 
Disparities in Subprime Mortgage Holders by Income in Pennsylvania, 
New Jersey, and Delaware               
  PENNSYLVANIA     
  African-American     
Income Level  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007
                 
Low  10.5%  17.4%  16.9%  8.8%  11.0%  18.4%  31.0%  43.4%  27.1%
Moderate  6.8%  11.7%  7.9%  10.7%  7.8%  17.1%  34.2%  42.1%  32.3%
Middle   8.9%  10.0%  9.3%  11.8%  8.7%  17.3%  31.5%  39.7%  28.5%
Upper  9.4%  11.4%  10.0%  9.6%  7.7%  16.7%  30.6%  43.4%  29.9%
Sample Size  1454  1536  1655  2302  3361  4361  4741  4973  4750
                 
  White      
Income Level  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007
                 
Low  4.4%  6.1%  4.1%  3.6%  4.3%  8.6%  12.4%  19.8%  15.2%
Moderate  3.2%  5.6%  4.2%  3.8%  4.4%  7.6%  13.0%  19.1%  13.4%
Middle   2.5%  4.4%  3.7%  3.5%  3.9%  6.3%  11.5%  16.5%  11.4%
Upper  2.3%  3.5%  3.1%  2.7%  2.9%  4.9%  9.0%  13.9%  9.8%
Sample Size  27591  24089  49826  68527  96185  83778  79699  63895  65002
                  
  NEW JERSEY       
       
  African-American     
Income Level  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007
                 
Low  1.4%  3.4%  3.2%  6.1%  10.7%  13.6%  23.8%  23.5%  23.8%
Moderate  3.4%  5.8%  3.8%  7.6%  8.3%  10.7%  24.5%  32.3%  18.2%
Middle   3.2%  5.9%  6.3%  5.8%  6.7%  12.0%  26.8%  31.3%  15.9%
Upper  3.1%  6.8%  3.7%  4.8%  6.3%  11.3%  28.6%  38.7%  27.1%
Sample Size  1546  1527  2322  3201  5281  6096  6795  6474  5572
                 
  White     
Income Level  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007
                 
Low  2.1%  2.8%  2.7%  2.5%  3.2%  3.3%  8.2%  11.8%  7.8%
Moderate  1.7%  3.5%  3.1%  2.3%  3.0%  3.8%  8.2%  12.6%  6.7%
Middle   1.7%  3.3%  2.7%  2.3%  2.7%  4.1%  8.2%  13.0%  7.3%
Upper  1.5%  2.4%  2.1%  1.6%  1.8%  3.0%  7.0%  14.2%  8.5%
Sample Size  24406  19575  43933  62481  89862  71078  62795  45628  45871
                 
  DELAWARE       
       
  African-American     
Income Level  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007
                 
Low  12.5%  21.4%  14.3%  0.0%  17.7%  13.9%  17.4%  25.0%  12.0%
Moderate  4.0%  5.6%  3.3%  5.2%  7.1%  12.0%  25.4%  29.3%  23.0%
Middle   7.5%  5.8%  4.7%  6.3%  11.8%  8.1%  30.2%  31.8%  17.0%
Upper  4.7%  9.7%  6.7%  5.3%  8.5%  9.6%  23.7%  36.0%  21.3%
Sample Size  235  265  362  492  428  1035  1239  1265  1027
                 
  White      
Income Level  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007
                 
Low  1.6%  6.7%  4.4%  4.5%  5.0%  3.1%  9.8%  10.1%  4.4%
Moderate  1.3%  4.0%  2.8%  2.5%  3.0%  4.2%  10.9%  15.2%  5.5%
Middle   2.2%  1.5%  2.8%  2.5%  3.3%  4.4%  10.6%  13.2%  7.4%
Upper  0.9%  1.9%  1.3%  1.5%  2.5%  3.1%  6.5%  10.7%  6.7%
Sample Size  2776  2617  5758  7699  6430  9623  8826  6289  6134
                 
                 
Note: These are univariate statistics.                 17
holders in the upper-income category. African-Americans 
had nearly two times the percentage of subprime loans 
as whites in the upper-income level in each of the three 
states in all years. This is worth mentioning since there 
is some speculation that some borrowers in this income 
category could have qualified for a prime loan but were 
taken advantage of and saddled with a subprime loan in-
stead.26 Alternatively, it may very well be that these bor-
rowers, despite their high incomes, were high credit risks 
who warranted a subprime loan.                             
Estimation Technique
  The existence of racial disparities in the share of 
subprime loans does not necessarily imply any bias toward 
any segment of borrowers. Clearly, the characteristics of 
the groups play a role. For a better understanding, we ex-
amine the likelihood that a borrower receives a subprime 
or prime home-purchase mortgage loan. This is accom-
plished by estimating logistic regressions of the following 
form for the three states studied pooled for each year from 
1999 through 2007:         
(1)  Lgn  =   βg  Xgn  +  μgn              (n = 1, …. , ng),
where Lgn  represents the binary choice of observation n 
in group g where L is either a prime or subprime loan (and 
L=1 if the borrower got a subprime home-purchase loan, 
and 0 otherwise); Xgn  is a 1 x KL vector of variables that 
reflect socio-economic, loan-related, and credit-related 
characteristics (see Table A-1 for a list of the variables); 
βg  is a KL x 1 vector of parameters; and μgn is a stochastic 
component of observation n in group g, where mean = 0 
and variance = σμg
2 or μgn ~ N( 0, σμg
2).
  Logistic regressions were estimated for all home-
purchase mortgage loans in all three states for each year. 
While the results of the regressions for all years will be 
discussed, Table 4 shows the findings of the logit regres-
sion for 2005 for illustrative purposes.27
  Most of the results for the regressions in all years 
are rather robust. As shown in Table 4, all of the vari-
TABLE 4.  
Logistic Regressions for African-
Americans and Whites in the 
Three States in 2005
Intercept  -1.8105*** 
  (0.2293)  
African-American  0.5903*** 
  (0.0276)  
Female  0.0919*** 
  (0.0192)    
 
Log Income  -0.1881*** 
  (0.0209)  
Loan Amount  -0.0010*** 
  (0.0001)  
FICO (559 or less)  3.7075*** 
  (0.0402)  
FICO (560 - 660)  1.9402*** 
  (0.0216) 
     
FICO (missing)  1.4089*** 
  (0.0247) 
     
Debt-to-Income (40 and over)  1.1001*** 
  (0.0248) 
     
Debt-to-Income (missing)  0.2500*** 
  (0.0240)  
Documentation (Full)  -0.2316*** 
  (0.0244) 
     
Documentation (Not Full)  -0.8386***   
  (0.0379)    
   
Tract Income (Low)  0.6527*** 
  (0.0595) 
     
Tract Income (Moderate)  0.4544*** 
  (0.0335) 
   
Tract Income (Middle)  0.2577*** 
  (0.0244) 
   
Minority Tract  -0.0717*** 
  (0.0354) 
   
Percent Denial  2.6131*** 
  (0.0940) 
   
Percent Turnover  -1.2984*** 
  (0.1198) 
   
Nonowner Occupancy   0.7400*** 
  (0.0300)  
 
Sample size is 172,246. Wald chi-squared test is 
20983.697 with 18 df (<0.0001).     
       
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.   
 
*** significant to the 5% level    
26 See National Community Reinvestment Coalition (2007), p. 18.
27 The regressions for the remaining years of the data used here are avail-
able from the authors upon request.18
ables, with the possible exception of one, have the expected sign and are statistically significant. For instance, 
a borrower’s income is inversely related to having a subprime versus a prime loan. Similarly, all three levels of 
tract income are positive, implying that income levels other than the highest ones are associated with a higher 
probability of taking out a subprime loan. Both loan amount and minority tract have an inverse association with 
the probability of having a subprime loan. While the former might be expected, a case could be made that the 
latter might have a positive sign.  However, the influence of the minority tract variable might be explained by 
drawing on a rationale offered in the study by Calem et al.: The result might reflect the presence of community 
reinvestment-type loans by depository institutions crowding out subprime loans.28 Both the full documentation 
and not full documentation variables are negatively associated with a subprime loan.29  Nonowner occupancy is 
positively related with having a subprime loan.The turnover rate and denial rate variables exhibit the expected 
signs.  In the former case, there is an inverse association with the probability of having a subprime loan, while 
there is a positive relationship in the latter case. Moreover, the variables reflecting a borrower’s creditworthi-
ness have the expected signs. Thus, borrowers with low credit scores (559 or lower and 560 to 660) and DTIs 
of 40 and over are more likely to hold a subprime loan. These results generally tend to hold to varying degrees 
in the remaining regressions. But perhaps the most compelling finding is the performance of the race variable. 
It is consistently positive and statistically significant in the regressions for all years (Table 5). This implies that 
African-Americans have a relatively high probability of having a subprime versus a prime loan.
  While the results of the logistic regressions are instructive, there is a potential concern when using single-
equation models to infer discrimination. As Yezer, Phillips, and Trost point out, a potential bias might arise in the 
estimated coefficients because some of the explanatory variables are endogenous. In the present context, DTI, 
loan amount, and borrower’s income are likely to be considered endogenous. To account for this possible concern, 
we performed a robustness test and found that any resulting bias had virtually no effect on the conclusions.30                                    
28 See Calem et al., p. 401.
29 The negative sign on the full documentation variable is expected. But the negative sign on the not full documentation variable might 
be misleading. In our data, the vast majority of those with these types of mortgage documentation received prime loans. However, the 
excluded variable is unknown documentation type, a category in which many borrowers received a subprime loan and are likely to have 
supplied low or no documentation during the mortgage process.      
TABLE 5. 
Race Coefficients from the Logistic Regressions by Year        
  Year  African-American Coefficient  Standard Error  Sample Size 
  1999  0.4606***  0.0765  74255 
  2000  0.3861***  0.0614  66050 
  2001  0.3522***  0.0601  121600 
  2002  0.6507***  0.0538  160121 
  2003  0.4358***  0.0462  215520 
  2004  0.2189***  0.0356  189152 
  2005  0.5903***  0.0276  172246 
  2006  0.4643***  0.0255  138864 
  2007  0.2614***  0.0297  140426 
     
*** significant at the 5% level      19
  Decomposition. Since the racial disparity cannot be justified by differences in the groups’ characteristics, 
we further investigate the racial gap by determining the fraction of the gap that can be explained by character-
istics. We do so by using a variant of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition technique developed by Fairlie.31  The 
approach allows for the decomposition when using a binary choice model to identify the factors that contribute 
to a borrower’s being more likely to receive a subprime home-purchase loan.  It permits the identification of the 
portion of the gap that can be explained by group differences in characteristics (or endowments) and the frac-
tion attributable to the returns to the characteristics (or coefficients) of groups. The basic underlying estimat-
ing specification used in the decomposition is a modification of equation (1), where equation (1) is estimated 
separately for each race in each of the three study areas using the same explanatory variables. 
  The nonlinear decomposition is represented as follows:
(2) 
where Xj is a row vector of average values of the independent variables,   is a vector of coefficient estimates for 
race j, and Lj  is the average probability of having a subprime loan for race j.                                                                                                             
  The decomposition can be performed in two ways. In this formulation, the African-American coeffi-
cient estimates,   ˆ A A β
− , serve as weights in the first term of (2), while the white distributions of the independent 
variables,  XW, serve as weights in the second term. Alternatively, the decomposition can be carried out with the 
white coefficient estimates as weights in the first term and the African-American distributions of the indepen-
dent variables as weights in the second term.  Both approaches are equally valid but have different implications. 
In the first method, the decomposition assumes that African-Americans possess the average characteristics of 
whites and receive the returns to these characteristics that were estimated from the African-American sample 
— which is referred to in this study as the African-American specification. The second approach assumes that 
African-Americans have their average characteristics and receive the returns to the characteristics estimated 
from the white sample — which is referred to here as the white specification. Moreover, these two approaches 
have different inferences from a policy perspective. In the former method, the implication is that, in time, 
African-Americans will have the same characteristics as whites. In the latter approach, some action might be 
necessary to ensure that African-Americans receive the same returns to characteristics as whites. However, in 
both cases, the racial gap is decomposed into a portion explained by the differences in group characteristics and 
a portion attributable to differences in coefficients (or behavioral responses to characteristics). 
  The marginal contribution of variables to the group difference in the gap is somewhat involved when 
using logistic estimation. According to Fairlie, if we assume that the two groups are of equal size (NW = NA-A) 
and there is a one-to-one matching of African-American and white observations, then using the estimated coef-
ficients from a logistic regression, the independent contribution of X1 to the racial gap in subprime rates can be 
expressed as:32 
(3)    
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30 We followed the procedure used by Courchane (2007), whereby we dropped DTI, loan amount, and borrower’s income and added bor-
rower’s income as a percentage of area medium income.  The results were quite similar to those reported here.
31 See Blinder (1973), pp. 436-55;  Oaxaca (1973), pp. 693-709; and Fairlie (2005), pp. 305-16 . 
32 See Fairlie (2005), p. 308.20
  However,  in  most  cases  the  two  groups 
have  different  sample  sizes,  as  is  the  case  here.   
Fairlie’s decomposition approach compensates for 
this by drawing a “random subsample of whites 
equal in size to the full black sample (NB).  Each 
observation in the white subsample and full black 
sample is then separately ranked by the predicted 
probabilities and matched by their respective rank-
ings.  This  procedure  matches  whites  who  have 
characteristics placing them at the bottom (top) 
of their distribution with blacks who have charac-
teristics placing them at the bottom (top) of their 
distribution.”33  Given that the resulting decom-
position  estimates  rely  on  the  randomly  chosen 
subsample of whites, possible issues might arise re-
garding the sampling. To avoid this concern, Fairlie 
recommends drawing “a large number of random 
subsamples  of  whites,  match  each  of  these  ran-
dom subsamples of whites to the black sample, and 
calculate separate decomposition estimates. The 
mean value of estimates from the separate decom-
positions  is  calculated  and  used  to  approximate 
the results for the entire white sample.”34  In the 
decompositions in this study, we used 200 random 
subsamples of whites.  
  The nonlinear decomposition of the Afri-
can-American–white gap in subprime mortgages 
was carried out for the pooled states in each year 
from 1999 to 2007, using both the African-Ameri-
can and white weights. Table 6 is representative of 
the decompositions and shows the portion of the 
racial gap in the probability of having a subprime 
loan that is explained by group differences in char-
acteristics for 2005, using both the African-Amer-
ican  and  white  specifications  as  defined  above. 
(The decompositions for the other years are in the 
appendix Tables B-1 and B-2.) The decomposition 
for 2005 indicates that the characteristics included 
in the estimation are all statistically significant and 
TABLE 6. 
Decomposition Results of Racial 
Disparities in Subprime Rates in 2005
  2005  
   
  (1)  (2)
Sample used for coefficients  African-American  White
   
White subprime rate  0.0929  0.0929
African-American subprime rate  0.2927  0.2927
White/African-American gap  -0.1998  -0.1998
   
Contributions from racial differences in:   
   
Female  -0.0010  -0.0017
  0.0011   0.0003 
  0.48%  0.87%
   
Log Income  -0.0022  -0.0031
  0.0015   0.0004 
  1.11%  1.53%
   
Loan Amount  0.0002  -0.0035
  0.0014   0.0003 
  -0.09%  1.76%
   
FICO  -0.0744  -0.0770
  0.0021   0.0008 
  37.24%  38.52%
   
Debt-to-Income Ratio  0.0007  0.0001
  0.0005   0.0001 
  -0.33%  -0.04%
   
Tract Income  -0.0125  -0.0138
  0.0029   0.0013 
  6.25%  6.93%
   
Minority Tract  0.0017  -0.0026
  0.0040   0.0024 
  -0.84%  1.28%
   
Percent Denial  -0.0397  -0.0436
  0.0042   0.0016 
  19.86%  21.84%
   
Percent Turnover  0.0017  0.0042
  0.0006   0.0004 
  -0.86%  -2.12%
   
Documentation  0.0069  0.0042
  0.0008   0.0003 
  -3.48%  -2.11%
   
Owner Occupancy  0.0019  0.0024
  0.0003   0.0001 
  -0.96%  -1.20%
   
Percent Total (Explained)  58.38%  67.25%
   
Sample Size  14,364  14,364
   
   
Note: All equations were estimated using the white 
specifications.   
33 See Fairlie (2005), p. 309.
34 See Fairlie (2005).21
account for 58.4 percent of the gap using the African-American specification and 67.3 percent for the white 
specification.  A closer look at the contributions made by specific characteristics reveals that borrowers’ credit 
scores and the percent denial variable are the major factors in explaining the racial gap in subprime rates in the 
two specifications. The influence of credit scores is 37.2 percent in the African-American specification and 38.5 
percent in the white specification, while the percent denial accounts for 19.9 and 21.8 percent of the total gap 
in the respective specifications.  
  It is interesting to note the contrast in the decomposition results of 2005 with those of 2003, a period 
in which subprime lending increased dramatically. The decomposition for 2003 shows that the group differences 
in characteristics explain 51.7 percent and 52.3 percent of the racial gap in subprime rates, under the African-
American and white specifications, respectively (Table 7). These percentages are lower than those for 2005. 
The decrease in the explanatory power of the group differences in characteristics might be due in large part to 
the change that took place in the financial environment during 2003. Low interest rates, an increased willing-
ness by investors on Wall Street to assume the risks associated with the securitization of mortgage loans, an 
excess capacity in the lending industry, and intense competition in the mortgage market all combined to create 
an explosion in loan originations nationally and in the three states we studied.35 The increase in subprime loan 
originations was particularly striking in the refinance area. Nationally, loan refinances totaled approximately 2.5 
trillion.36 Refinance loans in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware totaled 76.8, 95.7, and 7.2 billion, respec-
tively.37 However, the desire to accommodate the increased demand by investors for high-yielding mortgage-
backed securities38 led some lenders to loosen underwriting standards in order to generate more subprime loans 
for securitization pools.39 This was accentuated with the offering of loans requiring minimal or no documenta-
         
           
  Total Percent Explained   
  Year  White    African-American     White/African-  African-American  White
    subprime rate   subprime rate  American gap  Specification    Specification  Sample Size
           
  1999  0.0204  0.0556  -0.0352  65.5%  44.9%  6,511
  2000  0.0340  0.0868  -0.0528  69.5%  45.4%  6,777
  2001  0.0274  0.0655  -0.0382  64.1%  50.2%  7,677
  2002  0.0232  0.0730  -0.0498  48.3%  33.9%  9,003
  2003  0.0296  0.0761  -0.0465  51.7%  52.3%  11,617
  2004  0.0481  0.1366  -0.0885  72.4%  86.1%  13,959
  2005  0.0929  0.2927  -0.1998  58.4%  67.3%  14,364
  2006  0.1467  0.3845  -0.2378  58.0%  76.6%  14,528
  2007  0.0945  0.2411  -0.1465  65.8%  86.2%  13,623
TABLE 7. 
Summary of Nonlinear Decomposition Results of Racial Disparities 
in Subprime Rates: Total Percent Explained by Year
35 See Ip and Hilsenrath (2007); Bernanke (2007); Brubaker (2007); and Ashcraft and Schuermann (2008). 
36 See U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (2004).
37 See U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (2004). 
38 “The subprime loan securitization rate [grew] from less than 30 percent in 1995 to over 58 percent in 2003.”  See Chomsisengphet and 
Pennington-Cross (2006), p. 37.
39 See Hudson (2007).22
tion of income.40 In addition, some lenders made limited use of credit scores. These events no doubt lessened 
the influence of certain variables used here in explaining the racial gap in subprime rates.  
  This is further underscored by comparing the specifics of the decomposition results for 2003 and 2005 
(see Table B2).  Using the white specification, differences in group characteristics explained 52.3 percent of the 
racial gap in subprime rates in 2003, but 67.3 percent in 2005. Similarly, the contributions made by credit scores 
and the percentage of denial variables were 31 and 15.4 percent, respectively in 2003, but 38.5 and 21.8 percent, 
respectively in 2005. Alternatively, if the unexplained portion is viewed as a proxy for possible bias in lending — 
more will be said about this later — then a pure cross-sectional estimation of the influence of race in subprime 
lending in 2003 would be misleading. Such an approach would fail to reflect the distinct temporal explanatory 
aspect of the impact of race in subprime lending. Thus, an investigation of subprime lending over time using the 
decomposition technique provides a better context for assessing the effect of race as shown here.       
  Table 7 summarizes the decomposition of the African-American – white gap in subprime rates in 1999 
through 2007 that are explained by group differences in characteristics. As Table 7 shows, group characteristics 
accounted for 33.9 percent to 86.2 percent of the gap across the states studied and two specifications. But that 
leaves 13.8 to 66.1 percent unexplained. Some researchers regard the unexplained fraction as a measure of the 
discrimination in the mortgage market. However, the “unexplained” portion is somewhat difficult to interpret, 
since it might capture both group differences in unmeasurable or unobserved endowments and possible bias in 
the lending process.  
CONCLUDING REMARKS
  This study helps to highlight the influence of race in the allocation of mortgage capital between the 
prime and subprime markets. It improves upon previous efforts by using a unique data set and the analysis of 
the racial gap in subprime mortgages is carried out over time—1999 through 2007. Moreover, we employ an 
estimating procedure that allows the racial differences in the probability of receiving a subprime loan compared 
to a prime loan to be separated into that portion arising from differences in identifiable characteristics and the 
remaining unexplained portion. The results, for the most part, are quite robust. Credit scores and the denial 
rate for non-subprime conventional loans tend to be key factors in accounting for the difference in the racial 
disparity in subprime rates.  However, the influence of race remains contentious.  The statistically significant ef-
fect of race in the logistic regressions and the results of the decomposition of the African-American – white gap 
in subprime rates suggest a possible role played by race in the receipt of subprime loans instead of prime loans. 
Although the unexplained portion of the decomposition remains open for interpretation, the possibility of bias 
in mortgage lending for the period examined here cannot be ruled out.41 
40 See Ip and Hilsenrath (2007), p. A8.
41 This is predicated on the notion, as stated above, that some analysts regard the unexplained portion as an approximation of the degree 
of bias, while others maintain that it might reflect unmeasurable or unobserved factors.23
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TABLE A1. 
Definition of Regression Analysis and Decomposition Variables     
 
                         
African-American  Dummy variable that equals one if the borrower is African-American   
                   
   
Female  Dummy variable that equals one if the borrower is female     
                   
   
Log Income  Natural log of the borrower's income             
                 
Loan Amount  Amount of the borrower's loan           
                   
FICO (559 or less)  Dummy variable that equals one if the borrower has a FICO score of 559 or less   
             
FICO (560 - 660)  Dummy variable that equals one if the borrower has a FICO score between 560 and 
660                   
   
FICO (missing)  Dummy variable that equals one if the borrower has a FICO score that is missing 
                   
Debt-to-Income (40 and over)  Dummy variable that equals one if the borrower has a debt-to-income ratio of 40 and 
over                 
Debt-to-Income (missing)  Dummy variable that equals one if the borrower has a debt-to-income ratio that is 
missing 
                   
Documentation (Full)  Dummy variable that equals one if the borrower has a full documentation loan   
             
Documentation (Unknown)  Dummy variable that equals one if the borrower has a loan where the documentation 
type is unknown                 
               
Tract Income (Low)  Dummy variable that equals one if the tract is a low-income tract.  HUD designates 
a tract as low income if the tract median family income as a proportion of the MA's 
median family income is less than 50 percent.           
               
Tract Income (Moderate)  Dummy variable that equals one if the tract is a moderate-income tract.  HUD 
designates  a  tract  as  moderate  income  if  the  tract  median  family  income  as  a 
proportion of the MA's median family income is more than 50 percent but less than 
80 percent.               
 
Tract Income (Middle)  Dummy variable that equals one if the tract is a middle-income tract.  HUD designates 
a tract as middle income if the tract median family income as a proportion of the 
MA's median family income is more than 80 percent but less than 120 percent.   
                   
Minority Tract  Dummy variable that equals one if the census tract is over 30 percent minority    
             
Percent Denial  Denial rate for non-subprime conventional loans in a census tract   
                   
Percent Turnover  Number of home-purchase loans divided by total owner-occupied housing units in a 
census tract                 
             
Nonowner Occupancy  Dummy variable that equals one if the loan is non-owner occupied     
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TABLE B1. 
Decomposition Results of Racial Disparities in Subprime Rates by Year and 
Race Specification: African-American Sample             
   
                 
  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004   2005   2006   2007 
                 
                 
White subprime rate  0.0204  0.0340  0.0274  0.0232  0.0296  0.0481  0.0929  0.1467  0.0945
African-American subprime rate  0.0556  0.0868  0.0655  0.0730  0.0761  0.1366  0.2927  0.3845  0.2411
White/African-American gap  -0.0352  -0.0528  -0.0382  -0.0498  -0.0465  -0.0885  -0.1998  -0.2378  -0.1465
                 
Contributions from racial differences in:                 
                 
Female  -0.0010  0.0006  0.0002  0.0014  -0.0010  -0.0001  -0.0010  -0.0021  -0.0007
  0.0011   0.0011   0.0010   0.0009   0.0009   0.0007   0.0011   0.0012   0.0010 
  2.73%  -1.11%  -0.49%  -2.76%  2.11%  0.16%  0.48%  0.88%  0.45%
                 
Log Income  0.0021  -0.0002  0.0014  -0.0027  -0.0092  -0.0029  -0.0022  0.0039  0.0009
  0.0011   0.0016   0.0013   0.0016   0.0020   0.0010   0.0015   0.0013   0.0012 
  -6.03%  0.37%  -3.72%  5.38%  19.71%  3.28%  1.11%  -1.66%  -0.60%
                 
Loan Amount  -0.0112  -0.0064  -0.0099  -0.0061  0.0019  -0.0029  0.0002  -0.0011  -0.0027
  0.0017   0.0022   0.0018   0.0017   0.0018   0.0010   0.0014   0.0008   0.0009 
  31.80%  12.14%  25.87%  12.26%  -4.03%  3.30%  -0.09%  0.48%  1.81%
                 
FICO  -0.0025  -0.0086  -0.0061  -0.0095  -0.0095  -0.0440  -0.0744  -0.0873  -0.0581
  0.0013   0.0017   0.0014   0.0017   0.0014   0.0018   0.0021   0.0023   0.0022 
  7.07%  16.30%  15.96%  19.05%  20.32%  49.72%  37.24%  36.69%  39.62%
                 
Debt-to-Income Ratio  -0.0020  -0.0040  -0.0006  -0.0005  0.0006  0.0007  0.0007  0.0013  -0.0145
  0.0007   0.0009   0.0004   0.0004   0.0004   0.0002   0.0005   0.0004   0.0014 
  5.56%  7.65%  1.62%  1.06%  -1.36%  -0.79%  -0.33%  -0.54%  9.90%
                 
Tract Income  -0.0018  -0.0006  -0.0010  0.0000  0.0039  -0.0094  -0.0125  -0.0216  -0.0216
  0.0026   0.0032   0.0027   0.0026   0.0023   0.0022   0.0029   0.0034   0.0034 
  5.08%  1.05%  2.65%  0.04%  -8.29%  10.64%  6.25%  9.07%  14.71%
                 
Minority Tract  -0.0032  -0.0063  -0.0054  -0.0017  -0.0076  0.0027  0.0017  0.0008  0.0032
  0.0028   0.0032   0.0027   0.0026   0.0033   0.0037   0.0040   0.0043   0.0041 
  9.03%  11.89%  14.27%  3.39%  16.30%  -3.04%  -0.84%  -0.32%  -2.16%
                 
Percent Denial  -0.0024  -0.0069  -0.0031  -0.0034  -0.0060  -0.0149  -0.0397  -0.0430  -0.0291
  0.0016   0.0020   0.0017   0.0017   0.0016   0.0023   0.0042   0.0050   0.0042 
  6.79%  13.00%  8.04%  6.91%  12.92%  16.84%  19.86%  18.06%  19.88%
                 
Percent Turnover  -0.0049  -0.0076  -0.0010  -0.0035  -0.0013  0.0010  0.0017  0.0025  0.0024
  0.0022   0.0018   0.0011   0.0011   0.0006   0.0004   0.0006   0.0010   0.0006 
  13.91%  14.34%  2.51%  6.98%  2.87%  -1.17%  -0.86%  -1.04%  -1.64%
                 
Documentation  0.0037  0.0032  0.0011  0.0020  0.0038  0.0025  0.0069  0.0085  0.0197
  0.0010   0.0010   0.0004   0.0005   0.0009   0.0006   0.0008   0.0009   0.0020 
  -10.43%  -5.99%  -2.81%  -3.98%  -8.27%  -2.83%  -3.48%  -3.59%  -13.47%
                 
Owner Occupancy  0.0000  0.0001  -0.0001  0.0000  0.0003  0.0032  0.0019  0.0001  0.0040
  0.0005   0.0001   0.0001   0.0001   0.0002   0.0006   0.0003   0.0002   0.0003 
  0.03%  -0.17%  0.22%  -0.02%  -0.58%  -3.67%  -0.96%  -0.04%  -2.74%
                 
Percent Total (Explained)  65.54%  69.47%  64.12%  48.32%  51.69%  72.44%  58.38%  57.99%  65.77%
                     
Sample Size  6,511  6,777  7,677  9,003  11,617  13,959  14,364  14,528  13,623
                 
                 
Note: All equations were estimated using the African-American specification.             
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Table B2. 
Decomposition Results of Racial Disparities in Subprime Rates by Year and 
Race Specification: White Sample
                   
  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004   2005   2006   2007 
                 
White subprime rate  0.0204  0.0340  0.0274  0.0232  0.0296  0.0481  0.0929  0.1467  0.0945
African-American subprime rate  0.0556  0.0868  0.0655  0.0730  0.0761  0.1366  0.2927  0.3845  0.2411
White/African-American gap  -0.0352  -0.0528  -0.0382  -0.0498  -0.0465  -0.0885  -0.1998  -0.2378  -0.1465
                 
Contributions from racial differences in:                 
                 
Female  -0.0002  0.0000  -0.0005  0.0000  -0.0004  -0.0008  -0.0017  -0.0025  -0.0002
  0.0003   0.0005   0.0003   0.0002   0.0002   0.0002   0.0003   0.0004   0.0003 
  0.57%  0.07%  1.41%  0.02%  0.88%  0.90%  0.87%  1.04%  0.13%
                 
Log Income  -0.0011  -0.0023  -0.0019  -0.0027  -0.0049  -0.0029  -0.0031  -0.0030  -0.0060
  0.0004   0.0006   0.0004   0.0004   0.0004   0.0003   0.0004   0.0005   0.0005 
  3.00%  4.28%  4.94%  5.47%  10.48%  3.32%  1.53%  1.28%  4.09%
                 
Loan Amount  -0.0024  -0.0034  -0.0021  -0.0008  0.0003  -0.0030  -0.0035  -0.0010  0.0019
  0.0004   0.0006   0.0003   0.0003   0.0003   0.0003   0.0003   0.0003   0.0003 
  6.69%  6.42%  5.49%  1.59%  -0.68%  3.40%  1.76%  0.42%  -1.30%
                 
FICO  -0.0068  -0.0101  -0.0093  -0.0115  -0.0144  -0.0465  -0.0770  -0.1021  -0.0699
  0.0008   0.0008   0.0006   0.0006   0.0005   0.0006   0.0008   0.0009   0.0009 
  19.22%  19.21%  24.30%  23.07%  31.04%  52.59%  38.52%  42.95%  47.73%
                 
Debt-to-Income Ratio  -0.0013  -0.0025  0.0005  -0.0001  0.0009  0.0008  0.0001  -0.0009  -0.0084
  0.0004   0.0005   0.0001   0.0001   0.0001   0.0001   0.0001   0.0001   0.0003 
  3.78%  4.82%  -1.40%  0.12%  -1.98%  -0.86%  -0.04%  0.36%  5.75%
                 
Tract Income  -0.0012  -0.0015  -0.0023  -0.0021  -0.0017  -0.0076  -0.0138  -0.0153  -0.0153
  0.0010   0.0014   0.0008   0.0009   0.0009   0.0010   0.0013   0.0015   0.0015 
  3.48%  2.91%  5.97%  4.17%  3.59%  8.58%  6.93%  6.42%  10.47%
                 
Minority Tract  0.0005  -0.0014  -0.0015  0.0026  0.0022  -0.0029  -0.0026  -0.0049  -0.0001
  0.0017   0.0023   0.0016   0.0014   0.0012   0.0016   0.0024   0.0028   0.0027 
  -1.37%  2.64%  3.91%  -5.22%  -4.81%  3.24%  1.28%  2.06%  0.07%
                 
Percent Denial  -0.0049  -0.0031  -0.0007  -0.0021  -0.0072  -0.0199  -0.0436  -0.0713  -0.0491
  0.0011   0.0013   0.0007   0.0006   0.0007   0.0011   0.0016   0.0022   0.0020 
  13.89%  5.88%  1.91%  4.27%  15.44%  22.50%  21.84%  29.98%  33.51%
                 
Percent Turnover  -0.0017  -0.0015  -0.0017  -0.0006  -0.0004  0.0029  0.0042  0.0086  0.0053
  0.0004   0.0004   0.0003   0.0001   0.0001   0.0003   0.0004   0.0007   0.0004 
  4.72%  2.89%  4.48%  1.16%  0.90%  -3.24%  -2.12%  -3.61%  -3.60%
                 
Documentation  0.0030  0.0022  0.0002  0.0003  0.0008  0.0021  0.0042  0.0060  0.0076
  0.0007   0.0006   0.0001   0.0001   0.0002   0.0002   0.0003   0.0004   0.0006 
  -8.37%  -4.09%  -0.63%  -0.68%  -1.67%  -2.37%  -2.11%  -2.52%  -5.21%
                 
Owner Occupancy  0.0002  -0.0002  0.0000  0.0001  0.0004  0.0017  0.0024  0.0043  0.0079
  0.0002   0.0001   0.0001   0.0000   0.0001   0.0002   0.0001   0.0002   0.0003 
  -0.67%  0.36%  -0.13%  -0.11%  -0.92%  -1.93%  -1.20%  -1.82%  -5.40%
                 
Percent Total (Explained)  44.93%  45.39%  50.24%  33.86%  52.27%  86.12%  67.25%  76.57%  86.24%   
             
Sample Size  6,511  6,777  7,677  9,003  11,617  13,959  14,364  14,528  13,623
                 
                 
Note: All equations were estimated using the white specification.               
 